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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
/ 
JULIA V. WHETMAN, 
/ 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
/ 
vs. 
/ 
JOHN D. WHETMAN, Case No. 970642CA 
/ 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(h). This is an 
appeal from a final judgment of the Second Judicial District 
Court over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE, NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a final Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce from the Second Judicial District Court for the State of 
Utah, Davis County, Farmington Department. 
On May 6, 1997, a bench trial was held before JUDGE 
GLEN R. DAWSON upon a Complaint for divorce. A follow-up hearing 
on Defendant's objection to the Decree was held on July 31, 1997, 
and a subsequent hearing was held on October 1, 1997, regarding 
the Defendant's objection to the form of the Decree. 
The Decree of Divorce became final on October 1, 1997, 
in spite of the fact that the trial was concluded on May 6, 1997, 
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due to the fact that the parties had discrepancies as to the form 
of the final order. JUDGE DAWSON stated that for purpose of 
appeal, the Decree of Divorce would become final on October 1, 
1997. 
The Defendant, JOHN D. WHETMAN, mailed a notice of 
appeal on October 30, 1997, and filed with the Court on October 
31, 1997. 
On November 6, 1997, the Defendant mailed a motion to 
stay the lower court order to sell the subject marital residence. 
The Plaintiff objected to the Defendant's motion to stay the 
proceedings and a hearing was held on the Defendant's motion on 
Monday, December 22, 1997. Pursuant to the hearing, the 
Defendant's motion to stay the sale of the home was granted by 
the trial court. On December 31, 1997, Plaintiff filed a motion 
for summary disposition with the Utah Court of Appeals. On April 
13, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the Plaintiff's motion for 
summary disposition. On May 12, 1998, the Defendant filed a 
motion for extension of time to file the appellant's brief which 
was granted on May 14, 1998. This case now comes before the 
Utah Court of Appeals on the Appellant's brief. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Appellant, Mr. WHETMAN, contends that the trial 
court abused its discretion in its division of the marital 
assets. In this case, the Defendant came into the marriage with 
$97,000.00 in pre-marital assets compared to $35,000.00 in pre-
marital assets brought into the marriage by the Plaintiff. It is 
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undisputed that the Defendant had $62,000.00 more of 
contributions to the marriage than did the Plaintiff. The issue 
in the case at hand is whether or not the Defendant's Quit Claim 
Deed to the Plaintiff of his pre-marital estate was given undue 
weight by the trial court and whether the trial court adequately 
considered the circumstances surrounding the transfer of Mr. 
WHETMAN's pre-marital equity in his home by the Quit Claim Deed. 
The parties7 marriage lasted a total of three years, 
and the parties lived together only 20 of the 36 months of 
marriage. Also, whether the Court adequately considered the fact 
that by dividing the assets as it did, Mr. WHETMAN's children 
from his deceased wife, effectually lost their inheritance. 
A. The Standard of Appellate Review: 
The trial court's decision concerning the division of 
marital assets is reviewed under the abuse of discretion 
standard. Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1996), 
Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429 (Utah App. 1994). 
Pursuant to the case of Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 
(Utah 1985), the Supreme Court stated that: 
"although this case is equity and we are free 
to review both the law and the facts, we 
place the presumption of validity upon the 
trial court's actions in divorce cases. 
Thus, the burden is on the appellant to show 
error, and we will overturn the trial court's 
findings of fact only if they are contrary to 
the clear preponderance of the evidence." 
Berger at 697. 
The Supreme Court in Berger further stated that: 
"We will overturn the trial court's judgment 
where there has been a misunderstanding or 
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misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error or where 
there has been such an abuse of discretion 
that an inequity or injustice has resulted. 
Berqer at 697, citing Fletcher v. Fletcher, 
615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980). 
B. Citation to the record showing that the issue was 
preserved in the trial court; 
All of the issues presented in this appeal were argued 
in the trial court. The closing statement by Mr. WHETMAN's 
attorney setting forth the issues discussed in this brief are set 
forth at page 271 through page 279 of the transcript. 
The Appellant contends that the trial court's decision 
to divide the equity in the marital home equally, did not 
adequately consider the factors relating to distribution of pre-
marital property, recently considered in the case of Cox v. Cox, 
877 P.2d 1262, 1269 (Utah App. 1994). Those factors are: (1) the 
duration of the parties marriage; (2) the amount of contribution 
made by the Appellee to the. marital asset; (3) the intent of the 
parties in signing the Quit Claim Deed; (4) whether the property 
was acquired before or during the marriage; (5) what the parties 
gave up by the marriage; (6) whether the assets were accumulated 
or enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article IV, Section 1. [Equal political rights] The 
rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and hold office 
shall not be denied on abridged on the count of sex. Both male 
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and female citizens of this state shall enjoy equally all civil, 
political, and religious rights and privileges, (Emphasis added). 
The above constitutional right becomes applicable in 
this case in light of § 30-2-1 of the Utah Code which states: 
Wife's rights in property. 
Real and personal estate of every female 
acquired before marriage, and all property to 
which she may afterwards become entitled by 
purchase, gift, grant, inheritance, bequest 
or devise, shall be and remain the estate and 
property of such female, and shall not be 
liable for the debts, obligations or 
engagements or her husband, and may be 
conveyed, devised, or bequeathed by her as if 
she were unmarried. 
The Appellant would argue that under Article IV, 
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution, § 30-2-1 applies to males as 
well. Therefore, the Appellant will argue that the inheritance 
which he and his daughters received from the estate of his 
deceased wife, and the mother of this two daughters, should be 
kept within his family and should not be diverted because of 
divorce. See, Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 
1988); Izatt v. Izatt, 627 P.2d 49, 51-52 (Utah 1981). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 6, 1997, a trial was held before JUDGE GLEN R. 
DAWSON upon a Complaint for divorce. A follow up hearing on 
Defendant's Objection to the Decree was held on July 31, 1997, 
and a subsequent hearing was held on October 1, 1997. At trial, 
the Plaintiff was represented by Attorney TOM D. BRANCH, and the 
Defendant was represented by Attorney DOUGLAS B. THOMAS. The 
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Appellant, JOHN D. WHETMAN, was not represented by counsel at the 
hearings on July 31, 1997 or on October 1, 1997, as his counsel, 
DOUGLAS B. THOMAS, had withdrawn. 
Pursuant to the trial, the Court granted the Appellee, 
Mrs. WHETMAN, a Decree of Divorce based upon irreconcilable 
differences. The Plaintiff was awarded a judgment in the amount 
of $53,235.50 as her share of the equity in the marital 
residence. See Findings of fact at page 6. Mr. WHETMAN was 
awarded the residence subject to Plaintiff's judgment. Mr. 
WHETMAN was ordered to make immediate good faith efforts to 
refinance the home and pay the judgment in a lump sum payment 
payable to the Plaintiff and her attorney, TOM D. BRANCH, in the 
amount of $20,000.00, due on or before the 1st day of September, 
1997. The balance of the judgment was to be paid on a monthly 
basis for five years, with the first payment due October 1, 1997, 
and the full balance of the judgment, together with interest at 
the now present judgment interest rate to be paid in full, on or 
before September 1, 2002. 
A telephone conference was conducted by JUDGE DAWSON on 
October 1, 1997. Present by telephone were the Plaintiff, by and 
through her attorney, TOM D. BRANCH, and Mr. WHETMAN appearing 
pro se, his counsel DOUGLAS B. THOMAS having withdrawn. Pursuant 
to the telephone conference, the original Order of the Court was 
amended, and the parties were ordered to make immediate and good 
faith efforts to sell the subject marital residence, using a 
listing agent selected by Mrs. WHETMAN. 
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Mr. WHETMAN was ordered to provide the real estate 
agent with a key to the home and to allow the agent to have 
access to the home in completion of the agent's duties. He was 
ordered to keep the home in show condition and to maintain the 
outside and inside of the home and to have the home available for 
showing at any time during reasonable hours. Mr. WHETMAN was 
allowed to stay in the home during its listing and was ordered to 
keep the home obligations paid in full and timely. 
The Court ordered that when the home sold, the parties 
were to divide equally the equity received from the sale of the 
home after payment of the first mortgage, the line of credit, 
and all real estate commissions and other costs associated with 
the sale of the home. 
In its Findings of Fact, page 3 at paragraph 7, the 
trial court found that Mrs. WHETMAN had pre-marital assets in the 
approximate amount of $35,000.00, and Mr. WHETMAN had pre-marital 
assets in the approximate amount of $97,000.00. 
The Court found that the Plaintiff and Defendant were 
husband and wife having been married on February 18, 1994. 
The Court found that in June of 1995, Mr. WHETMAN 
signed a Quit Claim Deed on the home from himself to the parties 
equally as joint owners. Findings of Fact, page 4. 
The Court further found in paragraph 7 of the Findings 
of Fact that the parties mutually agreed to join together their 
respective assets and to share those assets jointly and equally. 
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Mr. WHETMAN is appealing the Judge's division of the 
equity in the marital home. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
At the time the parties married, Mr. WHETMAN had a home 
valued at $290,000.00 with $97,000.00 of equity. Mr. WHETMAN 
built the home using proceeds he had inherited for himself and 
for the benefit of his two daughters, from his deceased's wife's 
insurance policy. His first wife died from cancer on December 
19, 1989. Mr. WHETMAN testified that after being harassed, and 
badgered for many months, and at a time when the parties had 
separated several times, he succumbed to the pressure of his 
second wife to Quit Claim the Deed from his name alone to the 
parties as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship to the 
Appellee, JULIA WHETMAN. 
At trial, both of the parties stated that their intent 
in the transfer by Quit Claim Deed was not a gift, but was for 
the benefit of Mr. WHETMAN's children from a prior marriage, and 
the Appellee and her children, in the event that Mr. WHETMAN 
died. 
Since the marriage dissolved with Mr. WHETMAN very much 
alive, the Appellant would argue that the anticipated purpose of 
the Quit Claim Deed, as insurance for the children in the event 
of his death, never occurred, therefore Mr. WHETMAN's pre-marital 
inheritance for the benefit of himself and his children should 
have been returned to him by the trial court rather than divided 
as marital property. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RECORD SHOWS THAT IT WAS 
NOT THE INTENT OF EITHER PARTY TO GIFT THE 
PRE-MARITAL EQUITY IN THE PLAINTIFF'S HOME 
MRS. WHETMAN BY THE QUIT CLAIM DEED. 
The parties were married on February 18, 19 94 , Time 
of 1995, approximately 18 months after parties' marriage, 
WHETMAN signed a Quit claim Deed to the home from himself as sole 
owner to the parties as joint tenants, with full rights of 
survivorship to Mrs. WHETMAN. 
ml
 " :i t Claim Deed was signed on the 16th month of the 
marriage, the parties separated permanently four months 
later. 
At WHETMAN, test if i eel I ;hat there had been 
substantial strain on the marriage, and the parties had already 
separated at least two times before the Quit Claim Deed was 
si gi led Mr WHETMAN testi £i ed regard i ng 1:1: le reasoi l w hy he si gned 
the Quit Claim Deed: 
It was just at her request to make her feel 
more secure. She kept telling me that I'd 
had so much death in my family that Leishman 
luck said that something would probably 
happen to me. Her father had bankrupted or 
something a couple of times, her brother had 
died, my mother had died, my wife had died, 
and that was her reasoning, and I believed 
her. Transcript at 188. 
WHETMAN further stated at trial: 
She lead me to believe that she was having 
that done so that a home would be provided 
for her and my children in the event of my 
death. Transcript at 188. 
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At trial, when asked if he had prepared the Quit Claim 
Deed with the intent of gifting one-half interest in the property 
to Mrs. WHETMAN, Mr. WHETMAN stated "I did not". Transcript at 
186. 
Mr. WHETMAN did not consult an attorney prior to 
executing the Quit Claim Deed. Transcript at 189. and Mrs. 
WHETMAN never denied that she had in fact spoken with an attorney 
prior to the time that she signed the Quit Claim Deed. Mr. 
WHETMAN stated at trial: 
She told me after I had signed this, she 
blurted out that her father, on the advise of 
her father and an attorney, she was advised 
to get herself on the Deed. Transcript at 
190. 
The tenor of Mrs. WHETMAN's argument at trial was that 
Mr. WHETMAN had gifted her by Quit Claim Deed, a full right of 
survivorship in the home which he had prior to the marriage, 
including $97,000.00 worth of equity. However, Mrs. WHETMAN and 
her attorney were quick to deny that the Quit Claim Deed was 
characterized as a gift. During the trial, the following dialog 
took place regarding the Quit Claim Deed; 
Mr. Thomas: Mr. Whetman, coming back to the 
gift, the nature of the gift that was taken 
place, at least their claiming a gift, deed 
is what I want to refer to. 
Mr. Branch: Objection, your honor, we have 
not made that claim. 
The Court: I think their position has been 
that the preparation of the Deed, the 
recording of the Deed was part of an 
agreement entered into during the marriage to 
join all property (inaudible) person. I'm 
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probably the one that used the word "gift" 
and I apologize. 
Mr. Branch; And that could be a finding in 
this Court, but I'm just saying that he is 
mischaracterizing her testimony, she did not 
call it a gift. Transcript at 221. 
Mrs, WHETMAN, stated at trial that: 
I figured I would be in charge of his girls 
if something was to happen to him and I 
wanted them to have a home, I didn't want 
anybody out on the street. Transcript at 143. 
M
- WHETMAN stated at trial: 
She lead me to believe that she was having 
that done so that a home would be provided 
for her and my children in the event of my 
death. Transcript at 188. 
I t :i s c] ear £x oil the testimony < >l both parties t hat I, lie 
intent of Mr. WHETMAN's Quit Claim Deed was to provide for his 
children and, if he were still married at the time of his death, 
for Mr s , WHETMAN ai i ::i I: n = it: < : 1 :i i ] cii: en, Si i ice the par ties d :i vorced 
and it did not become necessary for Mrs. WHETMAN to care for Mr. 
WHETMAN's children, the original purpose for signing the Quit 
Claim Deed, never occuri. ed , 
Although Mr. BRANCH, Mrs. WHETMAN's attorney, was quick 
to point out at the trial that Mrs. WHETMAN never claimed that 
the Quit n " 1 a J mi Ht'cil nr i ifil! , I he trial :: ourt's ruling in 
effect gave the Quit Claim Deed the legal characterization of a 
gift. The evidence indicates that the parties' intent was to 
ne event of Mi WHETMZ death. 
Because Mr. WHETMAN's death did not occur prior to the parties' 
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divorce, the court, in equity, should have returned Mr. WHETMAN'S 
pre-marital equity to him as part of the divorce settlement. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ATTEMPTED TO 
RESTORE THE PARTIES TO THEIR PRE-MARITAL 
STATUS. 
This case is similar to the case of Cox v. Cox, 877 
P.2d 1262. In the Cox case, the Utah Court of Appeals held that 
where the husband had owned the house for many years before the 
marriage, and he had raised his nine children in the house, a 
distribution to the wife of one-half its value would not be 
equitable. 
This court in Cox indicated that under certain 
circumstances, the Court may properly attempt to restore the 
parties to their pre-marital status. The decision reads; 
Where the marriage is of short duration, 
where no children were born, and where the 
couple was married later in life, a trial 
court may properly attempt to restore the 
parties to their pre-marital status. Cox at 
1269. 
The trial court in the case at hand did not attempt to 
restore the parties to their pre-marital status in spite of the 
fact that the factors set forth in Cox were present in this case. 
Those factors are: (a) this was not a first marriage for either 
party; (b) the marriage was of short duration; (c) Mr. WHETMAN 
and his two children from a previous marriage had lived in the 
house prior to his second marriage, and substantial equity 
existed in the home prior to the marriage; (d) a distribution to 
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the wife of one-half the value would require him to sell the 
home; and ( ^ual division of the home's equity would give 
the wife a disproportionate return considering her lack of 
contribution the equity in the home. 
POINT III 
AS A GENERAL RULE, PRE-MARITAL PROPERTY, 
INCLUDING GIFTS AND INHERITANCES, IS VIEWED 
AS SEPARATE PROPERTY. 
Generally, real and personal property owned by either 
party prioi l.n l.L marrie -. - - ' gixt or 
inheritance, as «>•. ;,;; the increase on Lru property after 
marriage remains the separate property of the party. Utah Const. 
art I ' 7 § 3 See a 1 so § 30-2-] of I: .1 i< • \ IJtal Code.' 
In the case of Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 
the Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
We conclude that in utah, trial courts making 
"equitable" property division pursuant to § 
30-3-5 should in accordance with the rule 
prevailing in most other jurisdictions and 
with the division made in many of our own 
cases, generally award property acquired by 
one spouse by gift and inheritance during the 
marriage (or property acquired in exchange 
thereof) to that spouse, together with any 
appreciation or enhancement of its value, 
unless (1) the other spouse of his or her 
efforts or expense, contributed to the 
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of 
that property, thereby acquiring an equitable 
interest in it, Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d 
1380 (1973), supra, or (2) the property has 
been consumed or its identity lost through 
commingling or exchanges or where the 
acquiring spouse has made a gift of the 
interest therein to the other spouse. Cf. 
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 
1980) . 
13 
The court in Mortensen further elaborated; 
However, in making that division, the donee 
and their spouse should not lose the benefit 
of his or her gift or inheritance by the 
trial courts automatically or arbitrarily 
awarding the other spouse an equal amount of 
the remaining property which was acquired by 
their joint efforts to off-set the gifts or 
inheritance,... These rules will preserve and 
give effect to the right that married persons 
have always had in this state to separately 
own and enjoy property. It also accords with 
the normal intent of donors or deceased 
persons that their gifts and inheritances 
should be kept within their family and 
succession should not be diverted because of 
divorce. (Emphasis added). Mortensen at 308-
309. See also Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 
(Utah 1987); Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 
1144 (Utah App. 1988) . 
POINT IV 
MRS. WHETMAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE MARRIAGE 
DID NOT JUSTIFY THE TRIAL COURT'S EQUAL 
DIVISION OF THE EQUITY IN MR. WHETMAN'S HOME. 
In the case of Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 
(Utah, 1980), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In making a property division, a court may 
properly consider such things as the length 
of the marriage and parties' respective 
contributions of the marriage. This marriage 
lasted less than six years, and no children 
issued therefrom.... It was not unreasonable 
for the court to permit plaintiff to withdraw 
from the marital property the equivalent of 
those assets plaintiff brought into the 
marriage. Jesperson at 328. 
In the case at hand, the marriage was of short 
duration, a total of 36 months, of which, the parties lived 
together for only 20 months. No children were born as issue of 
this marriage, and this was the second marriage for each of the 
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parties, both parties having children from prior marriages. When 
the parties married, Mr. WHETMAN had a home valued by the trial 
court at $290,000.00. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 
page 5, paragraph 14). The trial court found that when the 
parties married, the Plaintiff had pre-marital assets in the 
approximate amount of $35,000.00 and the Defendant had pre-
marital assets in the approximate amount of $97,000.00. 
In its findir, le trial cotin t stated: 
...the Defendant intended the Quit Claim Deed 
to have legal consequences in that he 
expressed that he wanted to make sure that 
his wife and all of the children were taken 
care of at his death. (Findings of Fact at 
page 4) 
It is c IL'III tnitii I In.1 I'1 i nd.i nq;;i of Pdot m I (" nic 1 u,.i i ui«:; 
of Law that the trial court recognized that the Quit Claim Deed 
wa_ -,_~ *•*• '•«; as an out-right gift from Mr. WHETMAN to Mrs. 
WHETMAN r dividing the equity in the home on an equal 
basis, the court treated the Quit Claim Deed as if it were a 
gift. 
i11.!! Il I Hi cvuIeiKje pi esenleci by IniLh p d i t i e s s u p p u i t s 
the conclusion that the Quit Claim Deed was essentially made as a 
"poor man's will" which would have the effect that, in the event 
o f Mi: WHETMAN' I I I M I I I , In i , i - l n l d r t ' i w n u l U l h . i v e i ( i l a i . i i 1 I l i v e , 
assuming that at the time of his death, he were still married, 
and that Mrs. WHETMAN would also take care of Mr. WHETMAN's 
children,, from hi s previous marriage owever, F I 
not d ie, arid it never became necessary for Mrs. WHETMAN to care 
for Mr. WHETMAN's children from his previous marriage. 
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Therefore, the original intent of the Quit Claim Deed was never 
realized prior to the parties' divorce. In light of the fact 
that Mrs. WHETMAN never claimed that this was a gift, equity 
mandates that the trial court to the extent possible, return the 
parties to their pre-marital status. 
Regarding the contribution of Mrs. WHETMAN aside from 
the property which she brought into the marriage, Mrs. WHETMAN 
did not ~work during the parties marriage to any significant 
degree and in fact, when asked by the Defendant to possibly 
obtain employment to help the parties due to some financial set-
backs, Mr. WHETMAN testified that Mrs. WHETMAN stated many times 
"If I have to go back to work, there is no reason to be married." 
Transcript at 222-223. 
Apparently, the trial court placed an inordinate amount 
of weight on the Quit Claim Deed in light of the fact that 
neither of the parties ever alleged that the Quit Claim Deed was 
a gift. The trial court had ample opportunity to award the 
parties their pre-marital assets and divide any remaining 
property on an equitable basis. The court even acknowledged that 
the Quit Claim Deed was "strange", and further that "the evidence 
appears to show me that there was an agreement to work together, 
to join forces." Transcript at 273. By the court's own 
statement, it has recognized that the purpose of the Quit Claim 
Deed was to join forces to make a stronger marriage. However, 
when the marriage was terminated, the purpose of "joining forces" 
was no longer necessary and the court should have un-done the 
16 
effect of the Quit Claim Deed and returned the parties to their 
pre -mar it a ] s I: a t u s. 
In the case of Hogue v. Hogue, 831 P.2d 120 (Utah App. 
1992), this court upheld a trial court's ruling that awarded Mr. 
Hogue ,-.- - • aalf interest .: Rogue's pi: e-marital 
property in spite of the fact that "'.- Jul. of 1982, Mr. and Mrs. 
Hogue jointly agreed that Mr. Hogue would convey b^ Quit Claim 
Deed, sole ownership of the ranch to Mrs. Hogue as a means of 
protecting the property from Mr. Hogue's judgment creditors." 
Hogue at 121. 
It is clear that the trial court in this case was not 
compelled to honor the Quit Claim Deed, but had the equitable 
power to return the home to Mr. WHETMAN. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Georgedes v. 
Georgedes, 627 P.2d ,•*, the court held that there was no abuse of 
discJ - * . title to the home = i id bi is:i ness to t:l: le 
husband where, shortly after the inception of the parties' seven 
year marriage, the husband had put title in the home and business 
j n j • :::> :i in t t e n a i:i c y w :i I: h h :i s i \?r :i f e T I: I e e f f e c t o f t h e d e c i s i o i :i i n 
Georgedes was to restore each party the property he or she had 
brought into the marriage, which gave the Plaintiff, Mr. 
Georgedes, the home • 11111 business. 
In the case of Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 127 6 
(Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court held that it was not an abuse 
i J I" 11 L s e r e 1 J r HI In mi Mir I i J J I r o u i t In c r e d i t t h e wi fe wi t h 
i n h e r i t a n c e s she used t o purchase homes e a r l y i n t h e p a r t i e s 
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twenty year marriage. The case at hand is much more clear. The 
equity was present in the home prior to the parties' marriage, 
and the marriage was of very short duration. 
CONCLUSION 
There is ample evidence to suggest that the Quit Claim 
Deed from Mr. WHETMAN to Mrs. WHETMAN was not intended as a gift, 
but was an effort by the parties to make sure that Mr. WHETMAN's 
two girls from his previous wife were taken care of in the event 
of his death. The parties divorce terminated the need for the 
Quit Claim Deed, and the trial court should have, to the extent 
possible, returned the parties to their pre-marital status, in 
light of the fact that this was a marriage of short duration, the 
parties had no children between them, it was a second marriage 
for each of the parties, and there was no intent by Mr. WHETMAN 
to gift his inheritance and the inheritance of his two girls to 
Mrs. WHETMAN. 
Attached. 
DATED this 
ADDENDUM 
jtf^ day of June, 1998. 
G. SCO?T JEfiSEN 
Attorney, for Defendant/Appellant 
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Addendum A 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
TOM D. BRANCH (3997) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 262-1500 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JULIA L. WHETMAN ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
v s . ] 
JOHN D. WHETMAN, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. 964701115 
i JUDGE MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN 
This matter came on for Evidentiary Trial before Judge Dawson 
on May 6, 1997. A follow up hearing on Defendant's Objections to 
the Decree was held on July 13, 1997. Both parties appeared in 
person together with their respective counsel, Tom D. Branch for 
the Plaintiff and Douglas B. Thomas for the Defendant. Following 
the trial in the matter, the Court made the following Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties, in January of 1997, entered into a 
Stipulation which was memorialized in a Pre-Trial Order signed and 
entered by this Court on January 16, 1997 by Judge Allphin. The 
terms of that Pre-Trial Order are incorporated herein and are 
effective as of the date of that Order and are binding on the 
parties. 
2. Plaintiff was a bona fide resident of Davis County, 
State of Utah, for more than three months preceding the 
commencement of this action. This Court has jurisdiction and venue 
is proper. 
3. Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife having 
been married on February 18, 1994. 
4. The Plaintiff has four children from a prior 
marriage, ages 18, 17, 15 and 9. The Defendant has two children 
from a prior marriage, ages 12 and 8. There are no children born 
as issue of this marriage. 
5. The parties separated, following marital disputes 
that culminated and became more severe, on June 23, 1996, and have 
remained separated since that time. During the course of the 
marriage, the parties developed irreconcilable differences making 
the continuation of their marriage impractical and against both 
their desires. The Court finds reasonable grounds for granting the 
2 
Plaintiff a divorce based upon those irreconcilable differences. 
A Decree of Divorce should be granted to the Plaintiff on the 
grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
6. A Decree of Divorce should become final upon entry. 
7. At the time the parties married, the Plaintiff had 
pre-marital assets in the approximate amount of $35,000.00, and the 
Defendant had pre-martial assets in the approximate amount of 
$97,000.00. The parties mutually agreed to join together their 
respective assets and to share those assets jointly and equally. 
Both parties agreed to provide all of their energies, assets, and 
efforts to join their two families together as one and to raise the 
children. 
8. Consistent with that agreement, the parties did join 
their assets together. The Plaintiff gave all she had to this 
marriage. The Plaintiff left her home, job, and much of her 
furnishings to enter into this marriage, joined all of her pre-
marital property into the joint benefit of the parties, and became 
the primary care taker of all of the children, as was consistent 
with the desire of both parties. 
9. The Defendant also joined his assets into this 
marriage with the intent to share them equally with the Plaintiff. 
10. The parties took up residence in the Defendants pre-
marital home which had substantial pre-marital equity at the time. 
3 
However, in June of 1995, and consistent with the parties agreement 
to join assets, the Defendant signed a Quit Claim Deed on the home 
from himself to the parties equally, as joint owners. This action 
by the Defendant was consistent with the parties actions in joining 
all of their assets into marital property, and this action 
transferred the home into marital property. 
11. The Defendant signed the Quit Claim Deed without 
coercion, force, fraud, mistake, nor under any circumstance or for 
any reason that would make it void, voidable or unenforceable. No 
public policy was violated by the Defendant signing the Deed. The 
Court finds the Defendant could have refused to sign the Quit Claim 
Deed but did not. The Court finds that the Defendant executed the 
Deed to further the parties agreement as indicated herein and for 
no other reason that would cause this Court under case law to not 
enforce the legal impact of the Deed. 
12. The Court finds that the Defendant intended the Quit 
Claim Deed to have legal consequence and that he expressed that he 
wanted to make sure that his wife and all of the children were 
taken care of at his death. The Defendant signed the Deed 
knowingly and intelligently. The Defendant intentionally signed 
the Deed after having read it, requested it be prepared, and 
knowing full well its legal consequences. There was adequate 
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consideration for the Deed. The Defendant asked that the Deed be 
recorded and the Deed was recorded. 
13. The Court is not convinced that there are any facts 
in this case that would justify a division of the equity in the 
marital residence in any other percentage than equally. The Court 
reviewed case law submitted by the parties, conducted its own 
research, and is aware of the Court's discretion to award an 
unequal division of property or to disregard legal title of a 
marital asset, but finds no facts consistent with the case law that 
would justify anything other than an equal split of the marital 
residence equity. 
14. The Court finds that the fair market value of the 
residence is $290,000.00. The Court reviewed the testimony of the 
expert appraisers and all other persons testifying concerning the 
value and finds that equity requires that the value be set as 
indicated. 
15. The Court finds there is a first mortgage in the 
amount of $162,574.00 and a line of credit in a second secured 
position against the home in the amount of $20,955.00. The Court 
has deducted and not given credit for the $1,000.00 on the line of 
credit taken out by the Defendant after separation. 
16. The Court finds that the equity to be divided in the 
home is $106,471.00 and that the equity should be divided equally 
5 
and that the Plaintiff should therefore be entitled to payment from 
the Defendant for her share of the equity in the martial residence 
the amount of $53,235.50. The Defendant should be awarded the home 
subject to this obligation. 
17. The Plaintiff should be awarded a Judgment in the 
amount of the equity in the marital residence. The Defendant is 
awarded the residence subject to Plaintiff's judgment. The 
Defendant should make immediate good faith effort to refinance and 
should pay the Judgment as follows: A lump sum payment payable to 
Plaintiff and her attorney, Tom D. Branch, in the amount of 
$20,000.00 due on or before the 1st day September, 1997. The 
balance of the Judgment should be paid on a monthly basis, for the 
first five (5) years with the first payment due October 1, 1997, 
and the full balance of the Judgment, together with interest at the 
now present Judgment interest rate, to be paid in full on or before 
September 1, 2002. The monthly payments between September 1, 1997 
and September 1, 2002 should be calculated using the balance of the 
judgment owed after the down payment of $20,000.00 amortized over 
10 years. The Court will hold a telephone conference on September 
2, 1997 at 8:30 a.m. to discuss the status of the refinance 
efforts. 
18. The Court further finds that the Corolla automobile 
in question herein should be awarded to the Defendant who will be 
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responsible for all costs and debt related to that vehicle. The 
Defendant should hold harmless the Plaintiff on the Corolla debt. 
The Plaintiff should have deducted $1,500.00 from her judgment on 
the home equity as set forth above as a contribution for her share 
of the Corolla debt. If there have been any double payments as the 
parties testified to concerning the Corolla lease payments, the 
Defendant shall be entitled to the credit for those overpayments. 
19. Each party will be responsible to cooperate in the 
effectuation of this Courts ruling and in signing any and all 
documents necessary to put into place the effect of the Court's 
ruling. 
20. Concerning the parties dispute on personal property, 
the parties are awarded the following: 
TO THE PLAINTIFF 
a. All items in paragraph 2 of Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 4 including subparagraphs a through t. 
b. All items in Defendant's Exhibit 8 under title 
"Items to Julia" numbers 1 through 10 
TO THE DEFENDANT 
a. All items set forth in Defendant's Exhibit 8 
under "Items to John" numbers 1 through 7. 
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b. All other items currently in the home not 
otherwise specifically awarded to the Plaintiff 
herein. 
21. The Court finds that the Defendant should 
immediately make available the personal property awarded to 
Plaintiff for her pick up. The Plaintiff should be allowed to 
package and remove her own property items. 
22. Neither party is awarded attorney's fees and each 
are responsible to pay their own fees and costs in this matter. 
The Court finds that both of the attorney's fees were reasonable 
and necessarily incurred, but in light of equitable discretion, the 
Court finds considering the division of property set forth herein 
that each party should pay their own attorney's fees. 
23. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has a gross 
income of $1,300.00 per month and the Defendant has a gross income 
of $3,300.00 per month. The Court reviewed the expenses of both 
parties and took those into consideration in its ruling on 
attorney's fees. 
24. The Plaintiff should be awarded one half of the 
stock account in the amount $1,150.00. If the account was in 
existence on November 19, 1996, Defendant should pay immediately 
the $1,150.00 to Plaintiff. If the account was sold prior to 
November 19, 1996 as represented by Defendant the Plaintiff should 
8 
be entitled to a Judgment for the $1,150.00 payable as an addition 
to the Judgment previously granted for Plaintiff's share of the 
home equity, and on the same terms. 
25. On the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and this 
action. 
2. The Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce 
to become txnal upon entry. 
3. The Decree of Divorce should conform to these 
Findings and to- the parties Pre-Trial Crder which the Court 
specifically approves and incorporates herein as of its own date. 
Dated this _! day of-August, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
iU'i'KUVJClD AS T U rUKM.: 
9 
DOUGLAS B. THOMAS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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1 put my name on the quitclaim it", or something. 
2 Q What would he say when you would ask him those 
3 questions? 
4 A He'd say we'd get to it, that he intended to do it, 
5 always did intend to do it, that it was my house and there 
6 was no problem. And I did voice the concern of death because 
7 I figured I would be in charge of his girls if something was 
8 to happen to him and I wanted them to have a home, I didn't 
9 want anybody out on the street. 
10 Q Okay. And I assume he wanted the same thing? 
11 A I'm assuming, yeah. He said that it would be taken 
12 care of and that everything would be taken care of, to trust 
13 him. 
14 Q All right. He never said anything to the effect 
15 that, "No, I'm not going to deed this house to you, that's 
16 not the understanding?" 
17 A No, no, never. 
18 Q He always gave you affirmative responses? 
19 A Yes, I always had the impression that he was more 
20 than happy to include me in sharing his home. 
21 Q In June of 1995, there was a quitclaim deed signed 
22 by Mr. Whetman, recorded by Mr. Whetman's request, that 
23 deeded the legal ownership of that home from him to both of 
24 you, do you remember that? 
25 A Yes, I do. 
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1 Q And I don't know if you have that exhibit in front 
2 of you or not. 
3 A I don't. 
4 Q Let me show you just a copy of the quitclaim deed. 
5 A Okay. 
6 Q Until we can put our finger on the original, is 
7 that a copy of the quitclaim deed that you understood was 
8 signed in June of 1995? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q Tell us why we finally got to the point that a deed 
11 was signed, what happened? 
12 A We were discussing turning the Questar stock over 
13 into the Charles Schwab account because it was a joint 
14 account and the certificate thus far was in my name. And I 
15 said, "Well, when we turn this over to the joint account, why 
16 don't we take care of everything at once at get the home 
17 deeded to both of us and put this in the Charles Schwab 
18 account and that way everything will be jointly owned." 
19 Q Everything would be done--
2 0 A Everything would be done and basically everything 
21 would be taken care of that we'd discussed previously. 
22 Q All right, and did, what did John say when you said 
23 that? 
24 A He said, "Fine, call Gretchen and let's get it 
25 done." 
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Q Now, who's Gretchen? 
2 I A Gretchen is somebody that I now of through the 
3 mortgage company, she's a title officer and John also knows 
4 her and so we felt comfortable going to her because we knew 
5 her. 
6 Q So you instructed her to prepare that deed? 
7 A Uh-huh, yes. 
8 Q And did John talk to her? 
9 A John talked to her the day we went in to sign it. 
10 Q Do you remember what was discussed when you went in 
11 to sign it? 
12 A There was really no discussion, it was a lot of 
13 just, "Hi, how are you, and here's the deed", and she 
14 explained it to both of us. 
15 Q What did she say? 
16 A She said that if either one of us was to die that 
17 the house would go into that, it's a joint ownership so if 
18 somebody dies then the house turns over to that one person. 
19 Q As a survivor? 
2 0 A As a survivor. The survivorship is typed right in 
21 there. 
22 Q Did she describe anything about the present 
23 ownership of the home once that was recorded? 
24 A Yeah, she said that both of us would jointly own 
25 it. 
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1 A That is. 
2 Q Okay. 
3 MR. THOMAS: We'd move for the admission of Exhibit 
4 No. 2 as illustrative of testimony. 
5 MR. BRANCH: Same objections, Your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: All right, and I'll note the objection 
7 and receive Exhibit, Defendant's Exhibit 2. 
8 Q BY MR. THOMAS: All right. Now, there's been 
9 substantial discussion that has taken place thus far with 
10 respect to the deed whereby the property was transferred in 
11 your name solely into the name of you and your wife, and 
12 you've had a chance to review that deed today in your prior 
13 testimony, is that correct? 
14 A That's correct. 
15 Q All right. Now, prior to signing that deed, I 
16 believe your testimony earlier was that your wife hounded you 
17 to sign the deed. Could you please describe exactly what you 
18 meant by that? 
19 A She just continually was after me to add her to the 
20 deed and in the interest of marital peace I finally did. 
21 Q When you added her to the deed did you intend to 
22 gift to her half of the interest of your property in the 
23 home? 
24 A I did not. 
25 Q Where had you, that equity figure that we had 
1 
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24 
25 
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at the time you went into the marriage from your 
marital home, where had the proceeds come to get into that 
first home? 
! A 
insurance 
Q 
All of that came from the proceeds of life 
from my wife's death. 
When your wife passed away, how much did she leave 
in life insurance? 
A 
1
 Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
plaintiff 
96,000. 
And what did you do with that $96,000? 
It went into the bank until the new home was built. 
And from the bank where did it go? 
Into the construction of the new home, the lot. 
But essentially it was all--
Everything went into this new home. 
All right. At the time you got married to the 
, did you have discussions as to whether or not that 
home would become part of her property? 1 
A 
Q 
she would 
No, we did not. 
Did she ever indicate to you that she expected that 
be an owner of that property and be entitled to a 
half interest? 
A 
Q 
No, she did not. 
Did you ever have any discussions regarding any 
intent that she would be a half owner in the property? 
A No. 
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1 Q Okay, or a partial owner of the property for that 
2 matter? 
3 A No. 
4 Q Why did you, other than the hounding, were there 
5 any other reasons that influenced you to sign the quitclaim 
6 deed? 
7 A It was just at her request to make her feel more 
8 secure. She kept telling me that I'd had so much death in my 
9 family that Lieshman Luck said that something would probably 
10 happen to me, her father had bankrupted or something a couple 
11 of times, her brother had died, my mother had died, my wife 
12 had died, and so that was her reasoning and I believed her. 
13 Q Was the--
14 A She always told me that it's anything, everything 
15 bad will happen from marrying her. 
16 Q And so specifically what was she trying to protect 
17 against with respect to having the property transferred into 
18 her name? 
19 A She led me to believe that she was having that done 
2 0 so that a home would be provided for her and my children in 
21 the event of my death. 
22 Q At the time you transferred that deed, did you 
23 intend to give her a half interest in the property that had 
24 been purchased with your wife's insurance proceeds? 
25 MR. BRANCH: Objection, Your Honor, under the 
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1 statute of frauds, (inaudible) evidence rule as well. I 
2 mean, the deed is unambiguous so testifying that it meant 
3 something other than it does it against the rules of evidence 
4 unless you can prove some ambiguity. 
5 MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, with respect, and I refer 
6 you to the two cases that I cited to you this morning, the 
/
 ; ?2J : ^ —,- ?^ J LiL/ 
7 Jesperson case and the Georgettes, whatever it is case, both 
8 of those cases clearly made it very clear that simply the 
9 deed itself, a mere transfer itself, is not conclusive 
10 evidence that there was intent of a gift to take place. It 
11 doesn't necessarily mean that a gift has taken place. 
12 MR. BRANCH: That's not the issue that he's trying 
13 to put in. He's trying to change the legal effect or the 
14 intent of a document that is clear and the four corners of 
15 that document unambiguous, there is no reason under Pearl 
16 Evidence Rule that he should be able to any way set aside any 
17 of that document. 
18 THE COURT: Well, you've already asked him whether 
19 or not it was, he intended to make a gift, and he answered 
20 that no. 
21 Q BY MR. THOMAS: Prior to transferring the gift, did 
22 you speak with an attorney? 
23 A No, I did not. 
24 Q Did you know the legal consequences or have any 
25 idea of what the legal consequences would be of signing that? 
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1 A I had not ever considered them. 
2 Q When you--did there come a time when your wife 
3 admitted that she had, in fact, spoken with an attorney prior 
4 to the time of your signing of the deed? 
5 A Yes, she did. 
6 Q And what did she say to you? 
7 A She told me after I had signed this she blurted out 
8 that her father, on the advice of her father and an attorney, 
9 she was advised to get herself on the deed. 
10 Q Now, earlier your testimony was that, I want to 
11 make sure I characterize this correct, but this morning you 
12 testified, I believe, that it wasn't necessarily intended as 
13 estate planning. What did you mean by that? 
14 A Well, when Branch asked me about estate planning I 
15 assumed he was talking about a life insurance salesman coming 
16 to my house and selling me some kind of a plan. 
17 Q So if we were to rephrase the question and state, 
18 by deeding the property to your wife, did you intend to 
19 provide for her and your children in the event of your death, 
20 what would your answer be? 
21 A That was my intent. 
22 Q Now, Mr. Whetman, with respect to your current 
23 position, I hand you what has been marked Exhibit 3. What is 
24 the first mortgage balance on your home? 
25 A As of this month it's 162,574. 
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THE COURT: Any redirect? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
3 I BY MR. THOMAS: 
4 Q Mr. Whetman, coming back to the gift, the nature of 
5 the gift that was taken place, at least they're claiming a 
6 gift, deed is what I want to refer to. 
7 MR. BRANCH: Objection, Your Honor, we have not 
8 made that claim. 
9 THE COURT: I think their position has been that 
10 the preparation of the deed, the recording of the deed was 
11 part of an agreement entered into during the marriage to join 
12 all property (inaudible) person. I'm probably the one who 
13 used the word gift and I apologize. 
14 MR. BRANCH: And that could be a finding in this 
15 Court, but I'm just saying that he's mischaracterizing her 
16 testimony, she did not call it a gift. 
17 THE COURT: It was probably my fault. 
18 MR. THOMAS: That's fine, I'll just simply restate 
19 it. 
2 0 Q BY MR. THOMAS: With respect to the deed that had 
21 taken place, after you signed that in June of 1995, did there 
22 come a time when marital relations broke down? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And when did that take place? 
25 A Well, vocally things that she stated no later than 
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November '95, is my recollection. 
2 I Q And in November of 1995, what did she state to you 
3 with respect to having to go back to work? 
4 A She stated many times over and over, and I can 
5 quote her, "If I have to go back to work there's no reason to 
S be married." And her explanation of that was marriage--
7 MR. BRANCH: Objection, relevance, Your Honor. 
8 None of this is relevant to the issues at hand. 
9 THE COURT: I'll allow it, go ahead. 
10 THE WITNESS: She implied that she married me as a 
11 means of support, that the only reason to be married is so 
12 you don't have to go to work. 
13 Q BY MR. THOMAS: And between February of 1994 and 
14 November of 1995, did she in fact work at all during the 
15 marriage? 
16 A No. 
17 Q Did she state anything to you at that time that she 
18 was considering a divorce? 
19 A At what time are we talking about? 
20 Q November of 1995. 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q What did she say to you regarding that? 
23 A What I just stated that, "If I have to go to work 
24 there's no reason to be married." 
25 Q But did she specifically state, "I'm considering 
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1 I filing for divorce," or anything along those lines? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q And this divorce complaint didn't actually get 
4 filed until I believe June of 1996, what took place in those 
5 intervening months between November of 1995 and June of 1996? 
6 MR. BRANCH: Objection, relevance. 
7 THE COURT: And I'll note your objection. You go 
8 ahead. 
9 Q BY MR. THOMAS: What actually took place during 
10 those months, was it a smooth? 
11 A It was a very rocky time financially for us. I was 
12 trying to get employment and was dissatisfied with where I 
13 was working. We were strapped financially, it caused a lot 
14 of stress, particularly when I asked her to participate in 
15 going back to work, and every time I did she would respond 
16 with, if she had to work there was no reason to be married, 
17 which added to my stress and pressure. And then she's also 
18 telling me that she doesn't love me anymore and that her, in 
19 her words, she's closed herself off. 
20 MR. THOMAS: I have no further questions, Your 
21 Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Branch? 
23 RECROSS EXAMINATION 
24 BY MR. BRANCH: 
25 Q Was there a period of time, Mr. Whetman, when Mrs. 
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1 MRf THOMAS: That's correct. 
2 THE COURT: So to take Cox on its face it doesn't 
3 help you. 
4 MR, THOMAS: I understand--
5 THE COURT: Any of these cases on their face, you 
6 don't have a 73 and 68-year-old party here like you did in 
7 the Jesperson case. 
8 MR, THOMAS: No, Your Honor, but let's take a look 
9 at the equities because those are important. Is all that 
10 we're wanting is to have equity done here. We've got Mr. 
11 Whetman who comes into this marriage with a home that was 
12 built with the insurance proceeds from his former wife's 
13 passing, and that was her legacy to Mr. Whetman and her 
14 children, that is the amount that they received, okay, that's 
15 what they get from their mother in terms of an inheritance, 
16 that's it, that's what's there and that goes to Mr. Whetman. 
17 So he comes in with that figure, all right? 
18 Now, I think it's important to look at the duration 
19 of the marriage in this case. We're talking about a time 
20 period in February of 1994 and then admittedly they 
21 acknowledge she, in fact she's the one who raised the issue, 
22 that by October of that year, you know, seven, eight months 
23 after the marriage they're having marital problems, okay? 
24 This isn't the kind of relationship you think of as having 
25 everything going, you know, just fine. 
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1 I'd like to point out that initially Mr. Whetman 
2 was also contributing things that he had, he had the travel 
3 that he took the kids on, he had the tax refunds, he had his 
4 checking account, all of that came in as well. I think it's 
5 important to note that they didn't get together and just say, 
6 "All right, we're going to make everything joined together 
7 here at once." They didn't do that, that never happened. 
8 There's no evidence that they ever got together and said, 
9 "All right, we're going to get everything together at the 
10 same time and we're going to take care of all of these 
11 things." She kept the stock in her own name for a year and a 
12 half. 
13 THE COURT: Well, there is evidence from 
14 plaintiff's testimony that their agreement was that they 
15 would join assets, forces, and energies to make a good home 
16 for six children and a happy marriage for two people. 
17 MR. THOMAS: But Mr. Whetman--
18 THE COURT: That's fairly credible evidence to me, 
19 I have to tell you that. 
2 0 MR. THOMAS: I understand. 
21 THE COURT: I mean it's common, it's not an 
22 unnatural thing when two people get together to have that as 
23 a common goal. 
24 MR. THOMAS: But I think it is an unnatural thing 
25 for someone to say, "All right, you can have in this very 
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1 short term relationship one half of this $80,000 that has 
2 come from my wife's passing, that is my pre-marital 
3 property." That is something that would be very unnatural to 
4 take place. It was interesting to note from her testimony as 
5 well, she was talking about--
6 THE COURT: Love causes one to do strange things. 
7 MR. THOMAS: But that shouldn't be fair, Your 
8 Honor, it should not be equitable to allow her to get this 
9 huge windfall because that's all it is. She coming into this 
10 marriage with very few funds and she's going out with just 
11 about the same. Now, he comes in and he's got, you know, a 
12 position of about $98,000 and he's leaving with 70 even under 
13 his proposal, okay? If you are to switch the tables and buy 
14 into their proposal he leaves with a substantially smaller 
15 amount, and that's not fair, it's not just, it's not 
16 equitable particularly when he brought all of that in. 
17 Suddenly all his children's inheritance basically from their 
18 mother is gone, it's vanished. 
19 THE COURT: I hear what you're saying. Let me tell 
20 you what I'm having trouble with. As I view the evidence my 
21 best view is the most logical view, and I understand again, 
22 love is strange and it's not always logical, is that the 
23 evidence appears to show me that there was an agreement to 
24 work together, to join forces. The signature on the deed, 
25 the preparation of the deed was part of that plan. Part of 
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the reason I'm feeling that way is because I've not been 
given a good reason by the defendant as to why he signed that 
otherwise. To say someone hounded you would not cause 
someone it seems to me reasonably to sign away something he 
did not want to sign away. 
MR. THOMAS: There was more than that with respect 
to his testimony. I think he testified that he felt it would 
- — — • — • — 
be appropriate in case something were to happen to him to 
make sure that his children were taken care of. 
THE COURT: Okay, and I think he said his wife and 
his children. 
MR. BRANCH: That's right. 
MR. THOMAS: So--
THE COURT: And if that's the case isn't that 
further evidence of an intent to transfer? His testimony was 
his wife and his children in case he died. 
MR. THOMAS: I don't believe so because I think 
that that is simply, you know, if you will, almost a form of 
a poor man's will, if you will, where he's thinking in the 
event something happens to me during the marriage and we' re 
doing well then I would want them to have this. But it 
certainly wasn't his intent to convey to her his pre-marital 
interest in the property and there is a distinction between 
that, and I think it's a critical distinction. 
It's also noteworthy, just a couple of real 
I 
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1 important things on this, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
3 MR. THOMAS: And that has to do with the statements 
4 that were made, that he talked about the fact that she'd gone 
5 to an attorney before this. 
6 MR- BRANCH: No, his testimony was after. 
7 MR. THOMAS: No, his testimony was--
8 THE COURT: Go ahead and give me your best view. 
9 I'm the ultimate fact finder. 
10 MR. THOMAS: His testimony was that prior, she told 
11 him this afterwards, that she told him that prior to the time 
12 that she had had the deed done her father and her attorney 
13 had advised her to get the deed in her name. He didn't have 
14 the benefit of legal counsel. He didn't know exactly what 
15 was taking place with respect to that and he thought he was 
16 simply providing a means for his children to be looked out 
17 after if he died, but he wasn't intending to transfer the 
18 interest so that she would then get his pre-marital property. 
19 And that's a real important distinction. 
20 The equities of this case are so far out of whack 
21 where in essence these kid's marital, the home they lived in 
22 during the parties, during the parties marriage, but after 
23 their mother died, basically their legacy from their mother 
24 is suddenly going to be gone and it's going to be given to a 
25 person who's come in, the parties were together for a period 
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1 of 20 months total before things got really rocky. As of 20 
2 months into this marriage she was stating such things as, you 
3 know, "If I've got to work I might as well, I don't want to 
4 be in this marriage. I might as well be out of here." So 
5 she clearly did not want to work. She tried to claim, "Oh, I 
6 had to sacrifice by not working." Well, the fact is the 
7 evidence before the Court is that she didn't want to work. 
8 She liked that lifestyle and when it came time to change she 
9 said that "I'm out of here if I'm going to have to work. I 
10 might as well not be here." 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Thomas, let me ask you your 
12 position with regard to the appraisals. 
13 MR. THOMAS: Well, I think clearly Mr. Johnson's 
14 appraisal was the better appraisal for a couple of reasons. 
15 Number one, he looked at far more comparables than Mr. Reeder 
16 did and he had comparables that focused in a fairly close 
17 range, in other words, he was looking for that, you know, 
18 that cluster of comparables that would come out, and I 
19 believe he called it he mode. And he was looking for that 
2 0 (inaudible) of comparables and then based on that he used 
21 five different comparables. Most significant he even used 
22 one of the comparables of the home that's on that very 
23 street, okay? And he knocked that down because it's a 
24 smaller square footage and he knocked that down by a couple. 
25 But he pointed out how that had been on the market for over a 
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1 year and that in fact that had not been able to sell. 
2 THE COURT: For Sale by Owner? 
3 MR. THOMAS: Correct, For Sale by Owner. I also 
4 think it's important that Mr. Jones, the builder, Mr. Jones 
5 indicated he'd been building his homes for a long period of 
6 time and he essentially came in and said, "If I had to build 
7 that home and sell it today I would sell it for," and then he 
8 stated the figures, if the lot was $40,000 I'd sell it for 
9 approximately--
10 THfi COURT: I think he said it would cost this much 
11 to build. 
12 MR. THOMAS: 239 to build, and he said the lot 
13 was--
14 THE COURT: He gave a lot price. I don't think he 
15 said what he would sell it for, he said what it would cost 
16 him to build it. That's what I understood from his 
17 testimony. 
18 MR. THOMAS: I had asked him what he would sell 
19 that for. Those are the questions I believe that I was 
2 0 asking right around that was, "What would you sell it for 
21 today?" And he said, "239.7, that would be the sales price." 
22 THE COURT: Now, if--depending on what I do there 
23 is going to be an amount due your client to the plaintiff of 
24 somewhere between 25,000 approximately, 23,000, and could be 
25 75,000 or 80,000. They want 70, they want 5,000 attorney's 
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1 fees, they want 3,000, there's this 3,000 on a Toyota loss 
2 that someone has to pay there. They want credit I think on a 
3 couple of assets. 
4 MR. THOMAS: It's my understanding with respect to 
5 the Toyota, just so we're clear on that, it's my 
6 understanding that the parties agreed that that would be 
7 turned back to Mr. Whetman at the conclusion of these 
8 proceedings today and that he would then be responsible for 
9 that lease payment. 
10 THE COURT: But don't I have to determine who eats 
11 the $3,000 current loss? 
12 MR. THOMAS: Yes. 
13 THE COURT: I'm just adding these different things 
14 up and we're between 75 and 80,000 on this end and about 
15 23,000 on this end. How would he pay that? 
16 MR. THOMAS: At 70,000 he can't, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: The house would have to be sold? 
18 MR. THOMAS: The house is going to have to be sold. 
19 There absolutely no way that he could pay $70,000 
20 particularly when, you know, the evidence, we believe the 
21 better evidence shows the value of the home at 290, I mean 
22 there's absolutely no way that he'd be able to come up with 
23 $70,000 to be able to pay her anything. The only solution at 
24 that juncture is the home would have to be sold. That's all 
25 that could take place and the kid would have to be uprooted 
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that they've been in for about five years. 
COURT: 
THOMAS: 
COURT: 
THOMAS : 
COURT: 
five years at 
MR. THOMAS: 
I suppose if 
$23,000 figure 
refinance the 
THE 
home in 
COURT: 
some amount onto that 
suggest you're still 
MR. THOMAS: 
And were it something less than that? 
Well, you know, he stated that--
You wanted a payment plan over five 
That's right, and he's gone through--
At 10 percent just amortizing that 
10 percent? 
That's what he's requesting from the 
he has the ability, he certainly would 
, he would go out and attempt to 
order to get the $23,000. 
Two mortgages are 183,000, if you add 
the value is even in the range you 
going to be around 8 0 percent at worst. 
Correct, so if that's available to him 
he would be willing to do that in an attempt to cash her out. 
month? 
that he 
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MR. 
COURT: 
THOMAS: 
COURT: 
THOMAS: 
COURT: 
THOMAS: 
Is his testimony he now makes 3,300 a 
3,3 00 a month gross. 
Gross? 
Yeah, gross. 
And expenses of about 4,500? 
About 45. I think he also testified 
receives $1,280--
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and then I'll come back out and enter a decision. 
(Proceedings concluded) 
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